

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

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TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

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OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING FID NO. 043-18

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 043-18. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on April 15, 2019. I have adopted the recommendations from the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY¹

On July 6, 2018, at approximately 1702 hours, Communications Division (CD) broadcast the following information, "Van Nuys units, information on a 415 [Disturbing the Peace] man, in the area of 4961 Van Nuys Boulevard. [Inaudible] cell location, female reporting that son is acting erratic with guns in the residence. No history of mental illness. Information only at this time."

Note: The investigation revealed the 911 call for service was generated by the Person Reporting (PR), later identified as L. Stazel. According to Stazel, she believed her son, later identified as T. Honeycutt, was having a *psychotic break and had guns in the house*. Additionally, she claimed Honeycutt was *paranoid, delusional* and was *saying things that didn't make sense*. Prior to the completion of the call, Stazel is heard saying, "Help. [Inaudible] please." The CD operator called Stazel back and the call was forwarded to voicemail.

At approximately 1711 hours, CD broadcast the following radio call, "Any Van Nuys unit, ambulance male with mental illness at 4735 Tyrone Avenue. See the PR, the mother, female White, navy blue shirt, blue pants, can direct to subject, son, male mixed, 27 years, medium build, 6'8", no shirt, basketball shorts, possibly under the influence of unknown narcotics, previously throwing items at the residence. Subject known to have a 10mm handgun and a shotgun at the residence. Not armed at this time. Code Two."

¹ The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

Note: The investigation revealed that during Stazel's second call to 911, she informed the operator that Honeycutt was having a *psychotic break* and was *really worried* because he had *guns in the house*. Honeycutt had *knocked the phone out of her hand* the last time she called 911. Stazel provided the address, Honeycutt's name and physical description. In addition, she informed the operator that Honeycutt *may have smoked* marijuana, was acting *crazy* and had a *shotgun and a 10mm pistol* in the house. Stazel was *worried* that Honeycutt would *pull a gun on himself*. Stazel requested the response of both the police and fire departments.

At approximately 1721 hours, CD updated the radio call and broadcast, "Van Nuys units, your ambulance male with mental illness at 4735 Tyrone Avenue, is now a 415 man with a gun. PR called back, stated the subject is sitting in his bed with a gun in his hand and disconnected the line. It's Code 3, incident 3825 in RD 964."

Note: The investigation revealed that Stazel called 911 a third time and informed the operator that responding units needed to *shut off the sirens*, and that Honeycutt was *sitting on the bed with the gun in his hand*.

Officers W. Godoy, Serial No. 36495, and R. Gutierrez, Serial No. 40362, Van Nuys Patrol Division, attired in full uniform and driving a marked black and white police vehicle, requested the radio call be assigned to them. The officers advised CD they were responding Code-Three to the incident.

Note: According to Officer Godoy, while enroute to the radio call, he *read the comments of the call verbatim* to Officer Gutierrez and discussed tactics.

According to Officer Gutierrez, prior to their start of watch, he and Officer Godoy *discussed tactics*, including *contact and cover* roles, *foot pursuits* and *communications*.

A review of Officer Godoy's Body Worn Video (BWV) captured the officers discussing the option of utilizing the Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU) as a resource and lethal and less-lethal designations while enroute to the call.

As they were *offloading* their equipment from the rear compartment of their police vehicle, Officer Godoy verbally declared himself the Designated Cover Officer (DCO) and also assigned himself responsible for *communications*. Officer Gutierrez was designated *less lethal* with the 40mm Less-lethal Launcher and the TASER (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Contact and Cover Roles**).

According to Officer Gutierrez, they *determined* that Officer Godoy was the DCO and assigned to provide lethal cover, while Officer Gutierrez would be designated *less lethal cover officer*. Officer Gutierrez deployed the *40mm less lethal force option* (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Contact and Cover Roles and Additional**).

According to Officer Godoy, Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) personnel were already at the scene and advised the officers that there was a male holding a *shotgun on his lap*.

Los Angeles Fire Department personnel directed Officers Godoy and Gutierrez to the general area where the male, later identified as Honeycutt, was located. As they parked on Tyrone Avenue, just south of Riverside Drive, Officer Godoy placed them Code Six on their Mobile Digital Computer (MDC).

According to Officer Godoy, Stazel *approached and informed* them that she had *seen* Honeycutt *holding a handgun with three bullets in it and an unloaded shotgun*. Stazel was concerned for her dog and Honeycutt's safety. Stazel described the *property* as the house with the *white fence, described the inside of the location* and provided Officer Godoy with keys to the property.

Note: A review of Officer Godoy's BWV captured Stazel advising the officers that Honeycutt was *sitting on the bed holding a gun in his hand*. Stazel advised the officers that Honeycutt also had a *shotgun*; however, the shotgun had *no shells* in it, and the *pistol had three bullets in it*. In addition, she advised them that Honeycutt was a professional basketball player who played overseas and had spent the last *six months* ingesting *laughing gas*, which she believed may have *scrambled his brains*.

According to Officer Gutierrez, Stazel informed them that Honeycutt had *been using unknown narcotics and could have been ingesting some sort of chemical*. Additionally, she observed Honeycutt *sitting down in his bedroom with a shotgun in his lap*. Stazel had *left the location in fear for her life and called police*.

According to Officer Godoy, because Honeycutt *had a shotgun and a handgun in his possession*, he drew his service pistol as he and Officer Gutierrez began to approach the residence. Officer Godoy broadcast a *request for one additional unit and a supervisor to respond Code 3* (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Backup Request vs. Additional Unit Request and Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to Officer Godoy, he *cleared the east side* of the residence, which was *full of vegetation*. Officer Godoy then *cleared* a black vehicle that was parked in the driveway of the residence as he approached the *front gate*, located on the south side of the property. He *unlocked* the gate and entered the property.

According to Officer Godoy, he continued west through the walkway, along the garage then *pied* as he approached the southwest corner of the structure, so that he could *clear the south side of the property*.² He observed the residence had two south facing *front doors*. At this time Officer Godoy broadcast a request for *two additional units and a supervisor* to respond (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Contact and Cover Roles**).

According to Officer Gutierrez, as they *tactically approached the front of the residence*, he observed a *garage followed by a long wall*. There was a *long hallway* that extended west, *opening* to the residence located to the north.

²The term "pied" refers to "Slicing the pie" which is a tactical technique where an officer utilizes the angles provided by available cover to visually clear an area while minimizing their exposure to possible threats.

Note: A review of Officer Godoy's BWV captured him being asked by Officer Gutierrez if they should *wait* for additional resources prior to opening the gate. Officer Godoy responded, "Let me just peek around the corner, see what the status is" (**Debriefing Point No. 1**).

According to Officer Gutierrez, due to the *complicated layout* of the residence, he walked back towards the sidewalk approximately 20 to 25 feet from his partner to obtain additional information from Stazel. As he exited the *metal* gate, he propped the door open with a trash can to *prevent* it from *shutting*. At the sidewalk, Stazel informed Officer Gutierrez of the *layout of the location* which had *two doors in the rear*. The *red* door was the *front door* and the *gray* door led to Honeycutt's room. While speaking with Stazel, Officer Gutierrez maintained a *clear* and unobstructed *view of Officer Godoy* and could *immediately offer help and aid, in the case of any emergency*.

Note: The investigation revealed the distance between Officer Gutierrez and Officer Godoy was approximately 45 feet.

According to Officer Godoy, Honeycutt was first observed when he *opened the curtain* and *peeked out* of the window, that was *east of the gray door*. Officer Godoy attempted to *make contact* with Honeycutt by *clapping his hands* and *yelling at him*.

Note: The investigation revealed Officer Godoy broadcast a request for the first unit to respond with a shotgun and a police vehicle to respond to the front of the location for a *call out*.

A review of Officer Godoy's BWV captured Honeycutt behind a window on the south side of the residence at approximately 1735 hours. Officer Godoy communicated his observations to Officer Gutierrez who upgraded their request for an additional unit to a request for a *backup*.

According to Officer Gutierrez, as he walked back towards his partner, he *heard Officer Godoy* giving *commands* and instructing Honeycutt to *come out with his hands up*. Honeycutt refused to comply with Officer Godoy's commands. Based on the *information* he had received from Honeycutt's *mother* that Honeycutt was armed, Officer Gutierrez believed that due to the *tactical situation, deadly force could be utilized*. Officer Gutierrez drew his service pistol (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

Sergeants J. Briscoe, Serial No. 39133, and M. Gardner, Serial No 38607, along with Officers C. Gobble, Serial No. 38321, N. Shakhkerimyan, Serial No. 39308, J. Reiner, Serial No. 40737, and additional personnel from Van Nuys Patrol Division responded to the backup request.

According to Officer Gobble, he and Officer Shakhkerimyan parked on the *southeast corner* of Tyrone Avenue and Riverside Drive. Based on Officer Gobble's belief that Honeycutt was *armed with a shotgun* and a *handgun*, he believed that Honeycutt was in a *position of advantage by being inside the house*. Officer Gobble's patrol rifle would provide *better accuracy* and *better*

distance. Officer Gobble *grabbed* his *helmet* from the rear compartment of his police vehicle and deployed his patrol rifle (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to Officer Shakhkerimyan, upon his and Officer Gobble's arrival, he broadcast that they were *Code-6 over the radio*. He designated himself as *less lethal cover*, deploying the *40-millimeter launcher* and Officer Gobble was designated *lethal cover* with his patrol rifle. They *deployed* to the *south side* of the residence and *met* with the *primary unit*.

According to Officer Gobble, they met with Officers Godoy and Gutierrez who briefed them on the incident. They were advised that Stazel had observed Honeycutt *armed with a shotgun* and that Honeycutt also *owned a 10-millimeter pistol*. Officer Gobble *took a position* on the southwest corner of the garage, utilizing the south wall for as *much cover and concealment* as possible (**Debriefing Point No.2**).

According to Sergeant Briscoe, he notified CD that he was responding Code Three. Upon arrival, he advised CD that he was *Code-6*. Sergeant Briscoe immediately assumed the role of the Incident Commander (IC). As he approached the residence, he observed Stazel in front of the residence and directed her to a location of safety. Additionally, Sergeant Briscoe observed *three to four officers* giving Honeycutt *commands* from the *walkway*, on the *south side* of the garage.

According to Sergeant Briscoe, the officers *advised* him that Honeycutt was *armed* with a *gun*. Sergeant Briscoe learned that the officers were *making contact* with Honeycutt through the *windows of the residence*, but he was *failing to comply* with their *commands*.

Note: A review of Sergeant Briscoe's BWV captured Officer Gutierrez approach him on the driveway of the residence and advise him that Stazel observed Honeycutt, *a possible 5150 [Danger to Himself or Others], in his room, holding a shotgun in his lap, about five to seven minutes ago*. Sergeant Briscoe directed Officer Gutierrez to go and provide *less lethal cover*.

Sergeant Briscoe directed officers to *cover portions of the house* from a position of *cover and concealment* from the walkway on the south side of the garage. Based on the *knowledge* Sergeant Briscoe *had at the time*, Honeycutt was *either fitting the criteria of a 5150 armed with a firearm* or that he had *possibly brandished* or did an *assault with a deadly weapon* on Stazel (**Debriefing Point No. 2 and Command and Control**).

Note: A review of Sergeant Briscoe and Officer Godoy's BWV captured Officer Godoy communicate to Sergeant Briscoe a tactical plan to position a police vehicle in front of the residence to do a *call out*. If Honeycutt refused to surrender, they would call for the Metropolitan Division, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team.

According to Officer Godoy, while attempting to establish communication with Honeycutt, he observed Honeycutt in the *window east of the red door*. Honeycutt was *looking towards* their *direction* with the *handgun in his right hand, pointed down on his right leg*, and a *cellphone in his left hand, up to his ear*.

Note: The officers BWV captured Officers Godoy and Gobble announce that they had observed Honeycutt with a gun at 1739 hours.

The investigation revealed that at this time, Officer Gutierrez slung his 40mm Less-lethal Launcher and drew his service pistol. He assisted Officer Gobble in providing lethal cover to the south side of the residence from behind a wooden support post **(Debriefing Point No. 2 and Drawing/Exhibiting)**.

According to Sergeant Briscoe, as *officers began to arrive*, he directed units to establish containment around the residence. He directed officers to *cover west of the target location* along a *flag lot* (a property at the end of a long driveway), and requested officers deploy on the balcony of an apartment building *north* of the residence **(Command and Control)**.

According to Sergeant Briscoe, as he obtained a *better layout of the property*, he determined the property created a *tactical issue*, with the *front door* facing south to the neighbor's property. He believed there was *no way to deploy on the front* of the residence to *deal with* Honeycutt from the *south side*, with any *distance*. Furthermore, Sergeant Briscoe believed that the *only way to get eyes on* Honeycutt was from the *walkway on the south side of the garage* **(Debriefing Point No. 3)**.

According to Officer Reiner, he responded to the *backup* for a *man with a gun*. He donned his *helmet* and deployed his patrol rifle to have *superior firepower* over Honeycutt to *overcome his resistance if necessary* **(Additional/Required Equipment – Patrol Rifle Manipulations and Drawing/Exhibiting)**.

According to Sergeant Briscoe, he *directed Officer Reiner* to *cover the windows and doors west of the front door* in order to have *solid coverage of the entire* south side of the residence **(Command and Control)**.

According to Officer Reiner, he was directed by Sergeant Briscoe to join Officer Gobble as *secondary point* covering *westbound* on the residence. He took a position *behind Officer Gobble*, utilizing a *wooden beam* for *concealment*. Officer Reiner believed he *didn't have the best cover, but it was the best he could use at the time* **(Debriefing Point No. 2)**.

Due to the *multiple* number of *windows* that Honeycutt would appear in while *armed*, Officer Reiner communicated a plan with Officer Gobble to *split* the area of *responsibility as a safety precaution*. Officer Gobble would *cover* from the *red door east*, while Reiner was responsible for *covering the far side*, west of the gray door.

According to Officer Reiner, as he provided lethal cover on the residence, he observed Honeycutt *pop in and out* of view through the windows. He could *clearly see* Honeycutt talking on his *phone*, while *armed with a black handgun*. The officers communicated their observations to one another every time Honeycutt came into view through a window.

According to Officer Gutierrez, he *relieved* Officer Reiner as lethal cover officer on *numerous occasions*. While on *point*, he *saw* Honeycutt holding a handgun. Officer Gutierrez drew his service pistol in *defense of his life and his partner's life*, and the *belief* that the *situation was going to escalate to deadly force (Drawing/Exhibiting)*.

According to Officer Godoy, as *time went on*, Honeycutt was observed *peering through other windows*, while holding a *black semi-auto handgun in his right hand*. The officers attempted to *establish lines of communication* in an attempt to *get Honeycutt to talk to them*.

According to Officer Shakhkerimyan, he *relieved* Officer Gobble as lethal cover officer so that Officer Gobble could *relax his arms*. Prior to temporarily assuming the role of the lethal cover officer with his shotgun, Officer Shakhkerimyan was *told* that Honeycutt was *armed with a gun* and seen walking *back and forth* through the residence. Officer Shakhkerimyan was *briefed* on his *primary duties* and areas of responsibility to *cover* and took over Officer Gobble's position **(Drawing/Exhibiting)**.

According to Sergeant Gardner, she responded and assisted with establishing containment at the scene. She met with Sergeant Briscoe in front of the residence on Tyrone Avenue. Sergeant Briscoe advised her that he would *take control* of the tactical operation and asked if she could meet with Stazel to obtain additional information and establish a Command Post (CP). Sergeant Gardner established a CP on Riverside Drive, in front of an *apartment building* north of Honeycutt's residence **(Command and Control)**.

According to Sergeant Gardner, Stazel informed her that Honeycutt had *been walking around with a gun, throwing things*. He was *acting erratic* due to a *drop in blood sugar*. In addition, Stazel informed Sergeant Gardner that Honeycutt had experienced *mental illness* before and was taken to *Northridge Hospital three years prior* and released after *three hours* but was never placed on a hold for psychiatric evaluation. Sergeant Gardner requested the response of *MEU Code 3*.

Note: The investigation revealed that MEU provided a one and a half hour estimated time of arrival, due to traffic and travel time from Downtown Los Angeles.

According to Sergeant Briscoe, as the officers were continuing to establish *contact* with Honeycutt to gain compliance, Sergeant Briscoe reaffirmed that Officers Gobble and Reiner were designated *lethal cover officers*, Officer Gutierrez was designated *less-lethal cover officer* and Officer Godoy was designated as the *contact officer*. In addition, Sergeant Briscoe contacted the Watch Commander at Van Nuys Patrol Division and advised that Sergeant Briscoe was the *Incident Commander*. Sergeant Briscoe further briefed the Watch Commander on the situation **(Command and Control)**.

Note: Officers BWV captured multiple officers in the hallway attempting to give Honeycutt commands to *come out* and to *put the gun down (Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands)*.

At 1752 hours, Sergeant Briscoe called Sergeant Gardner and briefed her on status of the tactical operation. At that time, Officer Godoy informed Sergeant Briscoe that Honeycutt was refusing to comply with their commands and that he observed a second weapon in Honeycutt's waistband. Moments later, Sergeant Briscoe directed Officer Gutierrez to respond back to Sergeant Briscoe's vehicle to retrieve Sergeant Briscoe's helmet. Sergeant Briscoe temporarily assumed the role of less-lethal cover.

Captain B. Brockway, Serial No. 31055, Commanding Officer, Van Nuys Patrol Division, and Lieutenant G. Hoyte, Serial No. 35322, Van Nuys Patrol Division, responded to the CP. Captain Brockway assumed the role of IC.

Note: A review of Sergeant Gardner's BWV captured her advising Lieutenant Hoyte that Honeycutt was armed inside of his residence and was refusing to come out. Additionally, she advised him that Honeycutt had not committed any crime.

According to Lieutenant Hoyte, while at the CP, he was *informed* by Captain Brockway that the *officers* were *inside* the residence, *engaging* Honeycutt. Lieutenant Hoyte *ran* to the officer's location and met with Sergeant Briscoe. He was informed by Sergeant Briscoe that the officers were outside the residence, had *observed* Honeycutt through a *window* and were *communicating* with Honeycutt.

According to Lieutenant Hoyte, he obtained information that Honeycutt was *afraid* and would not *come out* because the officers were *pointing guns at him*. He communicated the information to Sergeant Briscoe. Based on the information gathered, they had a *verified armed suspect barricaded in the house*, however Honeycutt had not committed a crime.

According to Captain Brockway, based on the totality of information he had received at scene, they *did not have a barricaded suspect*, nor a crime. Captain Brockway *called* Lieutenant Hoyte and said, "Hey, we're going to have to redeploy. We're going to set up containment as we wait for other assets to respond. But D-Team [SWAT] is to not respond" (**Command and Control**).

According to Lieutenant Hoyte, he received a *phone call* from Captain Brockway who advised him they *don't have a crime*, and they *need to pull back and contain* Honeycutt.

According to Sergeant Briscoe, Lieutenant Hoyte advised him that the *officers needed to be redeployed onto Tyrone away from the walkway*. Lieutenant Hoyte then stated, "Remain and continue what you have if you think it's going to be effective."

Note: A review of Officer Shakhkerimyan BWV captured Lieutenant Hoyte advise Sergeant Briscoe of Captain Brockway's direction to redeploy. Sergeant Briscoe requested approval from Lieutenant Hoyte to attempt to make telephonic contact with Honeycutt before redeploying. Lieutenant Hoyte allowed Sergeant Briscoe to call Honeycutt, but directed him to redeploy if they were unsuccessful (**Command and Control**).

According to Sergeant Briscoe he obtained Honeycutt's cell phone number and directed Officer Godoy to call Honeycutt in attempt to establish *verbal contact* and have Honeycutt *comply*. Officer Godoy tried to communicate with Honeycutt *multiple times* over a *long period of time*. According to Officer Godoy, he *called* Honeycutt *multiple times*. He *asked* Honeycutt to *put his gun down and step out*. Officer Godoy advised Honeycutt that *he had not committed a crime* and would not be arrested. The officers were trying to get Honeycutt the *help he needed*. Honeycutt asked if the *officers could put their UPRs* [Urban Police Rifle] *down*. In response to Honeycutt's request, the officers held their patrol rifles in the *low-ready* position.

According to Officer Gobble, Officer Godoy had *built a rapport* with Honeycutt and *things were going really well* and Honeycutt appeared unarmed; however, Honeycutt was still voicing his concern about the *rifles*. Honeycutt appeared at a *window* next to the *gray door* and it seemed as if he was going to *come out*. Officer Gobble *took his hands off* his patrol rifle as Officer Godoy said to Honeycutt, "Look, they're not even touching their rifles. Just come out." Honeycutt *kept shaking his head, no, no and just resisting* (**Debriefing Point No. 4**).

According to Officer Reiner, Honeycutt was *intimidated by* their *rifles*. In an attempt to *de-escalate the situation, at certain points*, he and Officer Gobble would *drop* their patrol rifles *in the slings*. They would have their *hands on* their *side arm* in the event that they had to *use lethal force* (**Debriefing Point No. 4**).

According to Captain Brockway, he left the CP and walked to the residence and met with Lieutenant Hoyte, Sergeant Briscoe and Officer Godoy at the entrance of walkway. He directed them, "Redeploy everybody as we wait for CRT MEU [Crisis Response Team, Mental Evaluation Unit] to get here" (**Command and Control**).

According to Sergeant Briscoe, he advised Captain Brockway and Lieutenant Hoyte that *based on the tactical situation* and the position of the officers, they *needed to make sure that there's no crossfire issues* regarding containment, *prior to redeploying*.

Sergeant Briscoe walked away from the contact team and assessed the containment of the residence from the street. Sergeant Briscoe *formed the plan* to position a police vehicle southwest of Honeycutt's residence and have officers *cover the southwest corner of the house*. Although this repositioning took *a long period of time*, it allowed officers to contain the south side of the residence in the event Honeycutt attempted to *hop the fence*.

According to Officer Gobble, while attempts were being made to communicate with Honeycutt, he *appeared by the big window*. Honeycutt *appeared agitated* and *waving the gun* in the *air* in an *aggressive* manner. Honeycutt was *yelling* while talking on the *phone*, pointing the *gun* in a westerly direction, *away from* the officers. As Honeycutt moved away from view, Officer Gobble communicated, "He's got a gun. He rearmed himself." Honeycutt returned into view in the *window* and *raised something up*. Due to the *sun in* Officer Gobble's eyes, Officer Gobble did not *know if it was a cell phone* or if Honeycutt had *armed himself again*. Officer Gobble moved to *cover* and said, "Gun, gun, gun. I think he's pointing a gun at us."

According to Officer Reiner, Officer Gobble told him that Honeycutt *pointed a gun at* Officer Reiner and he *backed up to cover*. As he *moved forward*, Officer Reiner observed Honeycutt continue to appear at the window periodically.

According to Officer Gutierrez, while the plan was being developed to *redeploy*, he was standing behind Officers Reiner and Gobble. He observed Honeycutt *rapidly pop out* in view from the window *just east of the red door* with a *black handgun in his right hand*. Honeycutt pointed the handgun *directly where the officers were standing*, and he believed Honeycutt was *trying to shoot* them. Officer Gutierrez *jumped to cover* and said, "Gun. Gun. Gun. Suspect has a gun." *Fearing for his life*, Officer Gutierrez drew his service pistol and held it at a *low ready behind the officers (Drawing/Exhibiting)*.

According to Officer Gobble, Honeycutt *came back around* to the window that Officer Gobble was *covering* and he observed Honeycutt *peer through the window*. Using the *corner of the garage as a barricade*, he observed Honeycutt *point a firearm at him*. Officer Gobble, called out, "Gun, gun, gun," as Honeycutt *went back behind the curtains* and out of Officer Gobble's view. Officer Gobble redeployed *behind cover*, then *peered back around the corner*. At that time, he observed a *silhouette* of Honeycutt and a *black gun raise towards him*. Officer Gobble *disengaged the safety* on his patrol rifle as he brought his patrol rifle up. Officer Gobble *saw muzzle flash and glass shatter*. He knew Honeycutt was *shooting in his direction* because he felt *glass blow back onto him*. In fear for his *life*, Officer Gobble *pointed* his patrol rifle at the *middle of the window and fired one round back towards Honeycutt's direction* to stop the lethal threat (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Basic Firearms Safety Rules and Lethal Use of Force**).

According to Officer Gutierrez, he heard Officer Gobble say, "Suspect. Suspect. Gun. Gun," then heard *one loud shot*. Officer Gutierrez yelled out, "Shots fired. Officer needs help. Shots fired. Officer needs help," to alert the officers in the front of the residence. Additionally, he broadcast *shots fired, officer needs help* over his radio on the tactical frequency.

According to Sergeant Briscoe, he *heard one loud bang* while he was standing in front of the residence *discussing the plan* with Lieutenant Hoyte. Sergeant Briscoe *responded* to the walkway where the OIS occurred and observed the *officers were behind cover (Command and Control)*.

Sergeant Briscoe was informed that *Officer Gobble fired one round* in response to being shot at by Honeycutt. Sergeant Briscoe *verified* that a crime against an officer had occurred and advised Lieutenant Hoyte that the incident now met the criteria for a *SWAT callout*.

According to Lieutenant Hoyte, at the time of the OIS, he and Sergeant Briscoe were in the *process* of coordinating the evacuation of residents and *repositioning officers* to provide *cover* as they redeployed. Following the OIS, he advised Captain Brockway of the occurrence.

Note: The investigation revealed Captain Brockway was also in front of the residence being briefed by Sergeant Briscoe on the redeployment plan, when the OIS occurred.

According to Sergeant Briscoe, he and Lieutenant Hoyte formulated a plan to *redeploy* the *officers onto the street* and establish containment of the residence. Additionally, the plan consisted of creating more *cover and distance* for the officers in the walkway as they redeployed (**Command and Control**).

Note: The investigation revealed two police vehicles were positioned in front of the residence on Tyrone Avenue facing *westbound* to provide cover. Additional personnel took up a position of cover behind the police vehicles and provided cover to Officers Gobble, Gutierrez and Reiner as they were escorted away from the walkway.

According to Sergeant Briscoe, he *remained the tactical commander* of the incident while Lieutenant Hoyte *directed* Officers Gobble, Gutierrez and Reiner to a *safe location* where they were *separated and monitored*.

Sergeant J. Mojica, Serial No. 34802, Van Nuys Patrol Division, responded to the scene. Sergeant Mojica ensured the involved officers were separated and admonished not speak about the incident. Sergeant Mojica obtained a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from Officer Gobble (**Command and Control**).

According to Sergeant Gardner, she made the notification to Lieutenant C. McMillion, Serial No. 25987, Metropolitan Division, Special Weapons and Tactics, and provided him with an updated brief regarding the OIS. Lieutenant McMillion advised Sergeant Gardner that SWAT resources would be deployed.

The investigation revealed that SWAT personnel and resources responded to the scene and replaced patrol officers who were assigned to containment. The SWAT Crisis Negotiation Team responded and attempted to communicate with Honeycutt via cell phone and a Public Address (PA) system to no avail. A tactical plan was formulated and chemical agents were deployed into the residence in an attempt to persuade Honeycutt to exit. There was no response from Honeycutt. SWAT personnel then utilized Metropolitan Division K-9 personnel, SWAT personnel and various robots to initiate an entry into the residence. SWAT personnel located Honeycutt lying motionless and face down on his bedroom floor.

Los Angeles Fire Department personnel responded to the scene and pronounced Honeycutt dead at 0235 hours.

Note: The investigation determined that Honeycutt's death was the result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound to his head.

FINDINGS

Tactics – Administrative Disapproval, Lieutenant Hoyte, Sergeant Briscoe, Officers Godoy, Gutierrez, Gobble, Shakhkerimyan and Reiner. Tactical Debrief, Captain Brockway.

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Godoy, Gutierrez, Gobble, Reiner and Shakhkerimyan.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer Gobble.

ANALYSIS³

Detention

The involved officers responded to a radio call initially broadcast as a male with mental illness which was later upgraded to a 415 man with a gun radio call. Upon arrival, the officers were directed by the suspect's mother to the location of the suspect who was inside of his residence. The mother also provided keys to the property. The officers entered the gate leading to an outside walkway where they observed the suspect through the windows, holding a handgun inside of his residence. While attempting to establish communication, assess his mental health and gain compliance, the suspect fired at officers, which resulted in an OIS.

TACTICS

Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: "The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance"

Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: "A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques).

³ The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the investigation.

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

In this case, the officers observed the suspect inside of his residence holding a handgun. The officers attempted to communicate with the suspect by using verbal and non-verbal communication through the windows of the residence for nearly an hour. Additionally, Officer Godoy and Sergeant Briscoe utilized cell phone communication with the suspect for nearly 30 minutes, in an attempt to gain compliance and resolve the situation peacefully, without using force. The suspect did not comply with the officers' requests to drop the weapon or exit his residence.

Throughout the incident, the officers were patient and attempted to build a rapport with the suspect by utilizing a calm demeanor and empathetic tones in an attempt to gain his compliance. After assessing the suspect's behavior and refusal to comply, the officers and supervisors formulated a plan to contain the residence, redeploy to the street and await the arrival of mental health resources. As the officers were preparing to redeploy, the suspect fired a handgun at the officers through a window.

Faced with what was reasonably perceived to be an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death, the DCO utilized lethal force to stop the deadly threat.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Waiting for Additional Resources (Substantial Deviation – Officers Godoy and Gutierrez)

Officers are trained to work together and function as a team. In order to ensure officer safety and help ensure an appropriate outcome, the primary officers and cover officers must effectively communicate with one another. Appropriate communication involves advising the primary officer of any critical occurrences or safety issues (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training Learning, Domain No. 22).

Officers must approach every contact with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

Officers Godoy and Gutierrez did not wait for additional units to arrive prior to approaching the residence and entering the front gate.

Operational success is based on the ability of the officers to effectively plan and approach each incident in a safe manner. Officers, when faced with an ongoing tactical situation, must remain alert to improve their overall safety by utilizing their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. A sound tactical plan

should be implemented to ensure minimal exposure to the officers, while keeping in mind officer safety concerns.

In this case, Officer Godoy requested an additional unit and a supervisor prior to approaching the residence based on the information he had received that Honeycutt was armed with a firearm. Despite the lack of exigency, the officers made the decision to approach the residence and enter the yard prior to the arrival of the additional resources they had already requested.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Godoy and Gutierrez' decision to not wait for the additional units was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 2 Utilization of Cover (Substantial Deviation – Officers Godoy, Gobble, Gutierrez, Reiner and Shakhkerimyan)

Cover is defined as an object or structure that will stop the opponent's bullets. Officers should attempt to move to and use available cover when involved in any tactical situation and especially when there are weapons involved. Officers should be aware of what items in their surrounding area can be used as cover and what type of cover is required to stop specific rounds (handgun, shotgun or rifle rounds) (Los Angeles Police Department Basic Firearms Manual, January 2015).

The utilization of cover, coupled with distance, enables an officer to confront an armed suspect while simultaneously minimizing their exposure. As a result, the overall effectiveness of a tactical incident can be enhanced while also increasing an officer's tactical options.

In this case, officers had obtained information that Honeycutt was armed with a firearm. Upon entering the walkway, Officer Godoy observed Honeycutt inside the residence and began to communicate with him through the front windows from a distance of approximately 17 feet. Although Officer Godoy utilized the corner of the garage as a barricade position, he was continuously exposed to the windows that Honeycutt had unrestricted access to along the west side of the residence. Additionally, Officers Gobble, Gutierrez, Reiner and Shakhkerimyan periodically relieved each other and assumed the role of DCO. Due to the officers' positions in the walkway, they also did not have adequate cover as they were exposed to the windows on the west side of the residence. This left the officers without the benefit of adequate cover throughout the incident. It is the responsibility of each officer to continually assess their environment to determine whether they have adequate cover or if there is a need to redeploy to a more advantageous location. Knowing Honeycutt was armed and had access to all of the rooms and windows within his residence, I would have preferred the officers redeployed to a position of greater distance and cover.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officer Godoy, Gobble, Reiner, Gutierrez and Shakhkerimyan's actions were a substantial deviation, without justification from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 3 Containment (Substantial Deviation – Sergeant Briscoe)

***Redeployment and/or Containment.** Redeployment and/or containment can afford officers the added benefit of time and distance while continuing to maintain control of the situation. The addition of time and distance may give officers an opportunity to reassess, communicate, request additional resources, or deploy other tactics to reduce the likelihood of injury to both the public and officers while also mitigating any potential ongoing threats. Redeployment, however, should not enable a suspect to gain a tactical advantage, arm himself/herself, or flee and pose a greater danger to the public or officers (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques).*

Sergeant Briscoe knew that Honeycutt was armed with a firearm and yet he reaffirmed the officers' position of containment, which was approximately 17 feet from the closest window of the residence.

In this case, when Sergeant Briscoe arrived at the scene, he quickly assessed the situation in the walkway leading to the residence. He believed the layout of the property created a tactical challenge due to the location of the front door and the multitude of south facing windows. Based on his assessment, Sergeant Briscoe believed there was no way to deploy officers on the front or east side of the residence and still maintain visual contact of Honeycutt through the south facing windows. Therefore, he allowed officers to remain in a position that did not provide adequate cover.

Sergeant Briscoe continued to assess the deployment of officers and positioned Officer Reiner as a DCO behind a six-inch by seven-and-one-half inch wooden support post. This post provided limited concealment, however, it did not provide adequate cover.

The UOFRB noted that after Sergeant Briscoe's initial assessment, he should have immediately repositioned Officers Gobble and Reiner to a containment location that provided greater distance and more adequate cover on the east side of the residence. More distance and better cover might have provided the officers the benefit of more time to deal with the situation while at the same time mitigating the risk to the officers.

Sergeant Briscoe's decision to allow the officers to remain at the walkway and not redeploy to a location with further distance and better cover was not reasonable, or safe, and allowed officers to remain in a position of tactical disadvantage.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Sergeant Briscoe's decision to establish containment at the walkway was a substantial

deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 4 Tactical Communication/ Tactical Planning (Substantial Deviation - Officers Gobble and Reiner)

Officers must approach every contact with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

Officers are trained to work together and function as a team. In order to ensure officer safety and help ensure an appropriate outcome, the primary officers and cover officers must effectively communicate with one another. Appropriate communication involves advising the primary officer of any critical occurrences or safety issues (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training, Learning Domain No. 22).

The officers positioned at the walkway had formulated a plan that included Officers Gobble and Reiner as DCOs. On numerous occasions, Officers Gobble and Reiner took their hands off of their patrol rifles, allowing the patrol rifles to hang on their slings, without the benefit of anyone assigned as a lethal cover officer.

Operational success is based on the ability of officers to effectively communicate during critical incidents. Officers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall safety by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution.

In an effort to de-escalate the situation, Officers Gobble and Reiner took their hands off of their patrol rifles because Honeycutt had communicated that he was afraid of the rifles. In this case, the officers had confirmed that Honeycutt was armed and therefore took an unnecessary risk by taking their hands off of their primary weapon systems.

As such, this act momentarily left the officers without the benefit of lethal cover, placing themselves and their partners at a tactical disadvantage. Although I understand the officers did so with the intent to build rapport and gain voluntary compliance, their de-escalation technique compromised their safety.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, I have determined that Officers Gobble and Reiner's decision to release their hold of their patrol rifles and display their hands to an armed person in mental distress, without the benefit of a DCO, was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

Contact and Cover Roles – The investigation revealed that upon Officers Godoy and Gutierrez' initial response, Officer Godoy was designated as both the contact officer and DCO, while Officer Gutierrez was designated as less-lethal cover. As a result, Officer Godoy drew his service pistol in his right hand while holding his hand-held radio in his left hand. Officer Godoy is reminded of the tactical disadvantage of having a service pistol in one hand and an additional piece of equipment in the other hand. The officers are reminded to utilize the concept of contact and cover, during which one officer initiates contact while the other officer is the DCO. I will direct this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Back-Up vs. Additional Unit Request – The investigation revealed that Officer Godoy requested the response of an additional unit and a supervisor upon learning that Honeycutt was armed with a firearm. A request for backup units would have been more appropriate for this situation. Officer Godoy is reminded of the importance of assessing the level of threat at an incident and appropriately communicating the immediacy of the request for resources. In an effort to enhance future performance, I will direct this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands – The investigation revealed that although Officer Godoy was the assigned contact officer, several other officers gave simultaneous commands to the suspect during the incident. Although the commands were non-conflicting, the officers are reminded that simultaneous commands can sometimes lead to confusion and non-compliance by the suspect. In an effort to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

COMMAND AND CONTROL⁴

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, LAPD Emergency Operations Guide).

Line Supervision – Defined. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135).

It is incumbent upon supervisors at the scene of a critical incident, such as this, to demonstrate and exercise supervision that is consistent with Department supervisory and tactical training.

⁴Training Bulletin-Command and Control was adopted by the Department in July 2018, after this incident occurred.

In this incident, Sergeant Briscoe responded, assumed the role of IC and contacted the primary unit. After making an initial assessment of the situation, Sergeant Briscoe was advised that Honeycutt had been seen in the residence and was armed with a firearm. He designated officers as lethal cover, less-lethal cover and assigned a communications officer at the end of the walkway. Shortly after additional officers arrived, he began to set up containment of the residence with the help of the air unit. Sergeant Briscoe ensured proper containment of the location and evacuations of nearby residences were being completed.

Sergeant Briscoe was later directed by Lieutenant Hoyte to redeploy resources back to the street and await the arrival of additional resources. Lieutenant Hoyte advised it was determined that no crime had occurred and the incident did not meet the criteria for a barricaded suspect. Sergeant Briscoe requested to remain at end of the walkway to maintain visual contact on Honeycutt while efforts were made to communicate with him via cellular phone. After 34 minutes of intermittent communication with Honeycutt via cellular phone, Sergeant Briscoe was again directed to redeploy.

The UOFRB was critical of Sergeant Briscoe's decision to continually allow the DCO and communications officer to establish containment at the end of the walkway with inadequate cover. Though Sergeant Briscoe actively directed resources at scene, he did not reassess the officers' position, or redeploy the officers with a sense of appropriate urgency. The amount of time it took for Sergeant Briscoe to carry out the plan was lengthy and allowed the continued exposure of the officers in the walkway to an armed suspect. These actions were not reasonable and placed the officers in a situation of unnecessary risk. Additionally, at the time of the OIS, Sergeant Briscoe had stepped away from the walkway and into the street, leaving the officers with no supervisory oversight. I would have preferred that Sergeant Briscoe utilize the air unit to provide visual containment on the suspect rather than allowing officers to remain in a position of tactical disadvantage. Additionally, if further supervisory tasks were necessary, I would have preferred for Sergeant Briscoe to delegate those tasks to another supervisor so he could remain with the officers in the walkway.

As a result, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, Sergeant Briscoe's decision to allow officers to remain in a position of inadequate cover, the extended length of time it took to redeploy the officers and the leaving of the contact team without supervisory oversight at the time of the OIS, substantially deviated without justification from approved Department supervisory training, and thus warranted a Tactics finding of Administrative Disapproval.

Lieutenant Hoyte arrived after Sergeant Briscoe and assumed the role of IC. Upon determining that no crime had occurred, Lieutenant Hoyte was directed by Captain Brockway to have the officers in the walkway redeployed to the street. Lieutenant Hoyte contacted Sergeant Briscoe and directed him to have officers redeploy but permitted Sergeant Briscoe and the officers to remain in the walkway as they telephonically communicated with Honeycutt. Lieutenant Hoyte continued to oversee tactical operations and ensured containment and evacuations were completed while Sergeant Briscoe and the officers continued to try communicating with Honeycutt. Realizing that the officers on the walkway had not redeployed, Captain Brockway again directed Lieutenant Hoyte to redeploy the officers to the street to wait for additional

resources. Lieutenant Hoyte contacted Sergeant Briscoe again and after consulting with him, allowed the officers in the walkway to remain in place while other officers were being positioned to provide cover. It was during this time that the OIS occurred. I would have preferred that Lieutenant Hoyte recognized the peril that the officers in the walkway were in and followed Captain Brockway's direction to immediately redeploy them to a position of greater safety. The UOFRB was critical of Lieutenant Hoyte's lack of assessment and lack of recognition of the tactical issues that were created by the unique layout of the residence. Additionally, Lieutenant Hoyte was given clear direction by Captain Brockway to redeploy the officers. At the time, there was no immediate threat and no reasonable justification for the long delay in carrying out the direction given by Captain Brockway.

As a result, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, Lieutenant Hoyte's failure to ensure a timely redeployment of the officers, substantially deviated, without justification from approved Department supervisory training, and thus warranted a Tactics finding of Administrative Disapproval.

Captain Brockway responded to the incident and assumed the role of IC. Upon making the determination that no crime had occurred, he directed Lieutenant Hoyte to redeploy officers to the street and await additional resources.

Sergeant Gardner responded and established the CP and made notifications. Sergeant Mojica responded, separated, monitored and obtained a PSS from Officer Gobble.

The actions of these supervisors were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Lieutenant Hoyte and Sergeant Briscoe, along with Officers Godoy, Gutierrez, Gobble, Reiner and Shakhkerimyan's actions were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department tactical training, thus requiring a finding of Administrative Disapproval. Additionally, I find that Captain Brockway's tactics did not substantially deviate from approved Department tactical training.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were areas identified where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident. Therefore, I will direct that Captain Brockway, Lieutenant Hoyte and Sergeant Briscoe, along with Officers Godoy, Gutierrez, Gobble, Reiner and Shakhkerimyan, attend a Tactical Debrief and the specific identified topics are discussed.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On July 19, 2019, Sergeant Briscoe and Officer Gobble attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered including Force Option Simulator.

Drawing/Exhibiting

Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: *"An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.80).*

According to Officer Godoy, as he and his partner began to approach the residence, he drew his service pistol because Honeycutt had a shotgun and a handgun in his possession.

Officer Godoy recalled,

When a female white approached us, which turned out being the PR, the suspect's mother, she informed me what she had seen, which was her son holding a handgun with three bullets in it and an unloaded shotgun is what she told me.

I have a reasonable suspicion that it could escalate to the use of deadly force based on the fact that he had a shotgun in his possession and a handgun.⁵

According to Officer Gutierrez, as he walked back towards his partner, he heard Officer Godoy giving commands and instructing Honeycutt to come out with his hands up. Honeycutt refused to comply with Officer Godoy's commands. Based on the information he had received from Stazel that Honeycutt was armed, Officer Gutierrez believed that due to the tactical situation, deadly force could be utilized. Officer Gutierrez drew his service pistol.

Officer Gutierrez recalled,

Due to the -- the suspect's actions of him kind of poking his head back and forth and information having received that there was a gun involved we requested a backup, a

⁵ Officer Godoy, Page 8, lines 23-25; Page 9, lines 1-2 and Page 21, lines 7-10.

supervisor and an airship. At this point while I was with my partner, unholstered my weapon. I unholstered my weapon due to the tactical situation and my belief that deadly force could be utilized. I had received comment -- information from the mother that there was indeed a shotgun on his lap. I had also received information that he owned a handgun.

According to Officer Gutierrez, he *relieved* Officer Reiner as lethal cover officer on *numerous occasions*. While on *point*, he *saw* Honeycutt holding a handgun. Officer Gutierrez drew his service pistol in defense of his life and his partner's life, and the belief that the situation was going to escalate to deadly force.

Officer Gutierrez recalled,

On numerous occasions I -- I -- maybe three or four times I relieved Officer Reiner as point. As -- when I assumed the point position, I safely put my less lethal -- I slung it over my shoulder and unholstered my weapon. I unholstered my weapon again based on the tactical situation and the belief that it was going to escalate to deadly force. I also escalate -- unholstered my weapon because I physically saw the suspect holding a handgun. And in defense of my life and the defense of my partner's life, this is why I -- I drew out my -- my -- my duty weapon and pointed it down range. When I was cover/point officer, I observed the suspect again two or three times poking his head out of the large window that's just east of the red door. I communicated it to my partners. I observed him from the smaller windows. There's a set of three windows that are just east of the gray door. I also observed that there was a large dog in the residence. And observed that he was peeking various windows.

According to Officer Gutierrez, while the plan was being developed to redeploy, he was standing behind Officers Reiner and Gobble. He observed Honeycutt rapidly pop into view from the window just east of the red door with a black handgun in his right hand. Honeycutt pointed the gun directly where they were standing and Officer Gutierrez believed Honeycutt was trying to shoot them. Officer Gutierrez jumped to cover and said, "Gun. Gun. Gun. Suspect has a gun." Fearing for his life, Officer Gutierrez drew his service pistol and held it at a low ready behind the officers.

Officer Gutierrez recalled,

While I was standing there, I observed the suspect rapidly come to the window that -- that is just east of the red door. He suddenly popped out and I observed -- I believed that he had a handgun in his hand and pointed it at us kind of in a forward position towards us, directly where we were standing at. At this time there was -- the sun was setting directly behind the house. It was really, really hard to see, but from my perspective I believed that there was -- that he was trying to shoot us. He had a gun in his right hand, it was a black gun in his right hand and he pointed it at our -- towards us in a forward motion maybe two or three times. Once we observed that, I immediately jumped to cover behind the wall as did my other two partners. We communicated, "Gun. Gun. Gun." This was totally different than the -- than the times before where he was just talking around, holding the gun to his side, or with the gun in his waistband or actively talking on the phone with the gun. At this time, I perceived

that he held the -- he pointed the handgun towards me. And I was in fear for my life and for my safety being that he had a handgun in his hand. But being that I was behind the other two officers and being that I was designated as less lethal, I had no opportunity to to act. All I did was literally jump behind cover and communicate to my partner, "Gun. Gun. Gun. Suspect has a gun." My other partner saw the same. Said they saw him point a gun at us. They again went up on target and at this point communicated to the sergeant that he had pointed a handgun at us. At that point due to that situation, I basically placed down my less lethal, my 40 millimeter and transitioned over to my duty weapon. I unholstered my weapon due to the fact that he attempted to shoot at us. He pointed it at us. I had it at a low ready position behind the two other officers that were directly in front of me with rifles.⁶

According to Officer Gobble, based on the belief that Honeycutt was armed with both a shotgun and a handgun, he believed that Honeycutt was in a position of advantage by being inside the residence. In addition, Officer Gobble's patrol rifle provided better accuracy and distance. Officer Gobble grabbed his helmet from the rear compartment of his police vehicle and deployed his patrol rifle.

Officer Gobble recalled,

I took it out of the trunk because he was believed to be armed, or the mom said he was armed with a long gun, with the shotgun, as well as with handguns. So I didn't know if he had additional long guns, rifles. He was in a position of advantage by being inside the house. Obviously, using the house, the windows, as he was doing the curtains for concealment to have a tactical advantage over us. My rifle -- yeah. It offers me better accuracy, better distance. It's a better weapon system, I guess you could say, for -- for that, for --for that situation.⁷

According to Officer Reiner, he responded to a backup for a man with a gun. He donned his helmet and deployed his patrol rifle to have superior firepower over Honeycutt to overcome his resistance if necessary.

Officer Reiner recalled,

As that happened, over the radio, we heard that he had armed himself. And the mother hung up on the phone because she was the PR. So, once we were done, there was a unit that went over to that location. And simultaneously, we were wrapping up the perimeter and taking it down the tape and everything. As that happened, a backup came out of a man with a gun at that location.

Because the suspect was armed with a handgun. And that I wanted to have superior firepower to overcome his resistance if necessary.⁸

⁶ Officer Gutierrez, Page 10, lines 17-25; Page 11, lines 1-2; Page 13, lines 15-25 and Page 14, lines 1-9.

⁷ Officer Gobble, Page 20, lines 1-2 and Page 21, lines 1-12.

⁸ Officer Reiner, Page 7, lines 17-24 and Page 43, lines 4-6.

According to Officer Shakhkerimyan, he relieved Officer Gobble as lethal cover officer so that Officer Gobble could relax his arms. Prior to temporarily assuming the role of lethal cover officer with his shotgun, he was told that Honeycutt was armed with a gun and seen walking back and forth through the house. He was briefed on his primary duties and areas of responsibility to cover and took over Officer Gobble's position.

Officer Shakhkerimyan recalled,

I relieved my partner so he can relax his arms for -- for a few. I took point at the south side of the house looking to the -- to the windows for a few minutes, and I was relieved back again back by my partner. I was told that he is -- the suspect was confirmed to be armed with a gun, and he's going back and forth through and through the house. And I was briefed on what my primary duties were to cover while another officer was covering a different area.⁹

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Godoy, Gutierrez, Gobble, Reiner and Shakhkerimyan, while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified. Therefore, I find Officers Godoy, Gutierrez, Gobble, Reiner and Shakhkerimyan's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

Note: In addition to the above listed employees, there were additional personnel that either drew or exhibited firearms during the incident. This Drawing/Exhibiting was appropriate and requires no specific findings or action regarding these officers.

Use of Force – General

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance*

The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and from the articulated facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances. In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

⁹ Officer Shakhkerimyan, Page 12, lines 22-25 and Page 13, lines 1-11.

- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
- *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
- *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*
- *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
- *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
- *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
- *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
- *The availability of other resources;*
- *The training and experience of the officer;*
- *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*
- *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects; and,*
- *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances. (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10)*

Lethal Use of Force

Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the suspect's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

Officer Gobble – Smith and Wesson Model 15T, 5.56mm semi-automatic patrol rifle, one round in a northwesterly direction from an approximate distance of 17 feet.

According to Officer Gobble, while using the corner of the garage as a barricade, he observed Honeycutt point a firearm at him. Officer Gobble, called out, “Gun, gun, gun,” as Honeycutt went back behind the curtains and out of his view. Officer Gobble redeployed behind cover, then peered back around the corner. At that time, he observed a silhouette of Honeycutt and a black gun raise towards him. Officer Gobble then disengaged the safety on his patrol rifle as he brought his patrol rifle up. He saw muzzle flash and glass shatter. He knew Honeycutt was shooting in his direction because he felt glass blow back onto him. In fear for his life, Officer

Gobble pointed his patrol rifle and fired one round in Honeycutt's direction to stop the lethal threat.

Officer Gobble recalled,

He went back behind cover, and I came back out, and I peered back around the corner. And then I could see a silhouette, and I saw something long and black come up toward the window. And then he fired a shot at me. And then at that time, I fired one round back towards in his direction, in his general direction. When he fired the gun, I just saw like his hand come up in kind of like his silhouette through the -- through the drapes, and I could just kind of see like the top of the side like come up. And then when he shot the round, I could see the muzzle flash and the glass shatter. And then I got like a bunch of blow back, you know, glass shot right at me, so I knew that he was obviously shooting at me. He was shooting right in -- right in my direction. We had made eye contact there several times during the course of the incident, so he knew that I was there, and he knew that Officer Reiner was to my left because he was -- he continued to watch us like the whole time, and he was peering through windows. So, then he came around the window, and then I saw the -- the muzzle flash, and he fired one round at me.

And then I did another like peek around the corner. And then that was when I saw the actual --that's where I saw the actual like slide of like -- I could see his silhouette, and I could see something black like coming up. And then saw the flash. Saw the, you know, saw the glass. And then it was like boom, boom. And then I fired a round.

Because I was scared for my life, sir. I thought he was trying to shoot me. I thought he was going to try to kill me. We had -- he knew I was there that whole time. He came to that window, like I said, several times. He went to all the windows. He knew where I was. I hadn't really moved from that position. But he knew I was there. He knew I was there. And he stood right -- right in that window. He looked at me once kind of like with the gun, and then went back in real quick before anything happened. And then he came back, and he shot right at me. I mean, he looked -- he looked right at me. He looked at me, went back, and next thing you know, he shows up again, and then he shoots.¹⁰

So, as I came back around the corner and I disengaged the safety finger was -- trigger finger was along the frame and as I was bringing the rifle up I saw a suspect raise a black gun which we were told by his mom that he was the owner of a 10-millimeter Glock. So, I saw the muzzle at that time raised toward me. It was coming up and as it came up I then -- all I remember was seeing glass spray come at me so I obviously knew that he had fired and -- and I immediately reacted.¹¹

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Gobble, would reasonably believe Honeycutt's

¹⁰ Officer Gobble, Page 16, lines 2-25; Page 17, line 1; Page 51, lines 13-20; Page 64 lines 16-25 and Page 65, lines 1-12.

¹¹ Officer Gobble Second Interview, Page 5, lines 20-25 and Page 6, lines 1-3.

actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable. Therefore, I find Officer Gobble's Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Additional

Readiness of Equipment – The investigation revealed that Officer Gutierrez did not adjust the length of the sling of his 40mm Less-lethal Launcher to his measurement upon checking it out at the start of his shift. Officer Gutierrez struggled to sling the launcher on numerous occasions while at the scene of a critical incident. Captain O. Chandler, Serial No. 26288, Commanding Officer, Van Nuys Patrol Division, was advised of this and addressed this issue through divisional training, which was documented in the Learning Management System (LMS). The commanding officers of Operations Valley Bureau (OVB) and Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Patrol Rifle Manipulations – The investigation revealed that Officer Reiner did not conduct a chamber check prior to deploying his rifle. Captain Chandler was advised and addressed this issue through divisional training, which was documented in the LMS. The commanding officers of OVB and OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Post Categorical Use of Force (CUOF) Protocols (Notifications) – The investigation revealed that Sergeant C. Taylor, Serial No. 30414, Watch Commander, Van Nuys Patrol Division, did not notify the Department Operations Center (DOC) within 30 minutes of learning that a CUOF incident had occurred. Additionally, Sergeant Taylor did not document the justification for the deviation in his Watch Commander's Daily Report. Captain Chandler was advised and addressed this issue through divisional training and a Comment Card, which was documented in the LMS. The commanding officers of OVB and OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Audio/Video Recordings

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) / Body Worn Video (BWV) – The investigation revealed that numerous Van Nuys Division officers activated their DICVS while responding to the incident. The videos captured pre and post response to the incident, however did not capture the OIS. Van Nuys Division officers were equipped with BWV and captured various portions of the incident including the OIS. Officers Godoy and Gutierrez' BWV captured their contact with Stazel upon their arrival and their initial contact with Honeycutt. Officers Gobble, Godoy, Gutierrez and Reiner's BWV captured the contacts with Honeycutt, tactical planning, tactics and the OIS. Officer Shakhkerimyan's BWV captured tactical planning and tactics. Sergeant Briscoe's BWV captured tactical planning and tactics. Sergeant Gardner's BWV captured some of her actions at the CP and her interaction with Stazel.

Outside Video – Investigators searched the area around 4735 Tyrone Avenue for additional video of the incident. No additional videos were found.

Chief's Direction

The investigation revealed that after being requested there was a lengthy delay in response from MEU. As such, I am directing the Commanding Officer of Detective Bureau to review the circumstances of the delayed response and provide the findings back to me.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be "MR Moore", written over the printed name.




MICHEL R. MOORE
Chief of Police

Date: 5-1-19

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC NO. 043-18	CF NO.	DR. NO. 18-09-14034
Officer Involved Shooting		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

Location of Incident 4735 Tyrone Avenue, Sherman Oaks, CA. 91423	RD 0964	Date of Incident July 6, 2018	Date and Time of Board Review April 15, 2019 1300 Hours
Chair Deputy Chief J. Peters, Serial No. 25750	Signature of Approving Board Members:		
Member (Office Representative) Commander J. Rodriguez, Serial No. 25668			
Member (Personnel and Training Bureau) Deputy Chief M. Baeza, Serial No. 26624			
Member (Bureau Representative) Commander A. Hamilton, Serial No. 27393			
Peer Member Captain A. Ponce, Serial No. 31135			
Peer Member Lieutenant E. Bixler, Serial No. 33309			
Peer Member Sergeant C. Larios, Serial No. 36641			
Peer Member Officer V. Henson, Serial No. 38628			
Presenting Commanding Officer Captain O. Chandler, Serial No. 26288			
NOTES: <div style="text-align: right;"> RECEIVED MAY 03 2019 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL </div>			
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:			
MODIFICATION TO PRESENT POLICY, PRACTICES OR TRAINING:			
<div style="text-align: right;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COP Date Signed: <u>5/1/19</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PC Date Submitted: <u>5/1/19</u> </div>			

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Briscoe, Jeff		Serial No. 39133	Rank/Class Sergeant I	Incident No. 043-18
Length of Employment 10 years, 5 months		Current Division Van Nuys	Time in Current Division 0 years, 4 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes:

**Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/
Administrative Disapproval Finding**

☐ Extensive Retraining

☐ Notice to Correct Deficiencies

☐ Personnel Complaint

☒ Employee's Work History Reviewed

Notes:

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Brockway, Billy		Serial No. 31035	Rank/Class Captain I	Incident No. 043-18
Length of Employment 23 years, 10 months		Current Division Van Nuys	Time in Current Division 1 year, 4 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Godoy, Wilcer		Serial No. 36495	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 043-18
Length of Employment 15 years, 5 months		Current Division Van Nuys	Time in Current Division 1 year, 2 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Gutierrez, Roger		Serial No. 40362	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 043-18
Length of Employment 8 years, 9 months		Current Division Van Nuys	Time in Current Division 7 years, 7 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Reiner, Justin		Serial No. 40737	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 043-18
Length of Employment 7 years, 4 months		Current Division Van Nuys	Time in Current Division 0 years, 3 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes:

**Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/
Administrative Disapproval Finding**

- ☐ Extensive Retraining
☐ Notice to Correct Deficiencies
☐ Personnel Complaint

☒ Employee's Work History Reviewed

Notes:

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Shakhkerimyan, Nerses		Serial No. 39308	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 043-18
Length of Employment 10 years, 4 months		Current Division Van Nuys	Time in Current Division 5 years, 8 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police	Police Commission	
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**